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Abstract 
 
  We study a class of interactive decision making situations in which each agent must 
choose to participate in one of several lotteries with commonly known prizes. In contrast to 
the widely studied paradigm of choice between gambles in individual decision  making under 
risk, the probability of winning a prize in each of the lotteries in our study is endogenously 
determined. In particular, for each lottery, it is known to decrease in the number of agents 
choosing to play that lottery. We construct the Nash equilibrium solution to this game and 
then test it experimentally in the special case where each lottery yields only a single prize. 
The results show a remarkable degree of tacit coordination that supports the equilibrium 
solution under the assumption of common risk-aversion. However, this coordination is not 
achieved via individual level randomization. Rather, the entry decisions of most of the 
subjects can be characterized by local adjustments to the outcome of the previous iteration of 
the same game along the lines suggested by anticipatory learning models. 
   3
1. Introduction 
It often happens in markets that the demand for some good far exceeds the supply, but 
suppliers do not increase prices in order to reduce demand. For example, this is the case when 
there is a surge in demand for new products (e.g., toys, electronic gadgets) that are introduced 
in the market at a fixed price and become fashionable, or when tickets for popular concerts 
and other cultural events are sold to the general public. In general, shops do not increase the 
price of air conditioners when there is a surge in demand due to a heat wave, customers are not 
required to pay more for snow shovels after a severe snow storm, and restaurants do not 
increase their prices on Saturday nights (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986)
1. Depending on 
the nature of the good and the social context, societies have developed alternative mechanisms 
to allocate the limited supply.  
Mechanisms for allocating limited supply 
A common mechanism is the priority list in which claimants are ranked according to 
some measure of need, contribution, seniority, power, or some combination of factors. For 
example, priority to receive an organ for transplantation may depend on the likelihood of 
success of the transplantation, urgency of the case, and other related factors; and admission to 
public housing often depends on financial need and family size (Young, 1994). The problem 
with this mechanism is that the criteria for determining priority lists are often open to heated 
debate raising controversial issues of fairness. A second mechanism for allocating indivisible 
goods that are in short supply is simply to distribute them to those who demand them first. 
Seats in popular restaurants, tickets for most sport events, and new products (e.g., Sony Play 
Station 2) are typically sold in this fashion. The problem with this popular “first come, first 
served” mechanism is that it creates inefficiencies (queueing in lines), imposes hardship on the 
claimants, and penalizes customers who cannot stand in line. For example, McDonald’s has 
recently been criticized by a political party in Hong Kong over the long queues formed by   4
consumers to collect the “Hello Kitty” and “Dear Daniel” toys that it distributed in its 
restaurants.  A Democratic Party legislator suggested that “McDonald’s should consider lucky 
draws” (Hong Kong Standard, July 20, 1999).  This takes us to a third mechanism that avoids 
the inefficiencies associated with the “first come, first served” mechanism and the 
controversies associated with allocation by priority lists.  This mechanism distributes the 
limited supply by a lottery. For example, apartments in new development housing projects in 
Hong Kong, positions in medical schools in the Netherlands (Young, 1994), hunting permits, 
and IPO shares to individual investors are allocated in this manner. The principle underlying 
this mechanism is of no preferential treatment; each of the claimants is assigned the same 
probability of getting it
2. 
The major feature of these lotteries is that the probability of winning a given prize is 
determined endogenously so that the larger the number of persons participating in the lottery, 
the smaller the probability of winning one of the prizes it offers. Our interest in the present 
paper is in problems of tacit coordination that arise when claimants can register to only one of 
several independent lotteries. For example, households in Hong Kong seeking to purchase a 
new apartment (a commodity in short supply) are often presented with alternative public 
development projects that put out for sale (at a fixed and attractive price) individual 
apartments by lottery, but are prohibited by law from registering for more than a single 
apartment (to prevent speculation). 
The lottery mechanism is not to be interpreted narrowly; it has other interpretations 
that dispense with the need of throwing dice, tossing coins, or using some other random device 
to determine the allocation of prizes. For example, consider the case of competing firms, each 
faced with the decision wh ich of several newly emerging markets to enter. The firms may 
fully recognize their mutual interdependence. Budget constraints often prohibit the firms from 
entering more than a single market. Although no physical lotteries are involved in this case,   5
each firm's decision is typically based on the conditional probability of successful entry into 
one of the markets, given the anticipated number of entrants into this market (as well as on the 
profit associated with successful entry into one of the different markets). If the subjective 
probability of each firm of successful entry into a given market is proportional to the number 
of entrants into the same market (in other words, each firm believes that its chances of success 
are neither better nor worse than those of any other of the competing firms), these commonly 
shared beliefs operate like a lottery mechanism.  
Whether a lottery mechanism is physically used to allocate the prizes or the system of 
commonly shared beliefs operates like a lottery mechanism, the decision is strategic because 
the probability of winning any given prize, once one of several alternatives (e.g., housing 
projects, newly emerging markets) is chosen, depends not only on the number and values of 
the prizes associated with each of the alternatives, but also on the decisions made by other 
participants.  Depending on the assumptions made about the agent's information structure, 
interactive decision making situations of this type may be modeled as non-cooperative n-
person games under either complete or incomplete information. However modeled, these 
situations include two sources of uncertainty: strategic uncertainty about the choices made by 
the other agents, and outcome uncertainty about the result of the lottery chosen to be played by 
the agent. 
  The purpose of the present research is to investigate tacit coordination under both 
sources of uncertainty when n agents have to choose only one of several alternatives 
(lotteries) in which the prizes associated with the choice of each alternative are d etermined 
probabilistically. Because there is no simple way to assess systems of beliefs and verify 
whether or not they are commonly shared in real-life situations, we resort to experimentation 
that uses physical lotteries. We propose a game to simulate the situation, construct its Nash 
equilibrium solution, and then examine its descriptive power.    6
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Consumer Choice of Prizes 
(CCP) game that we propose for simulating basic features of the problem, and then constructs 
and illustrates its multiple equilibria. Section 3 describes a laboratory experiment that allows 
for only a single prize in each location but varies the values of the different prizes. The CCP 
game is extended in Section 4 to the case where only the distribution of the group size n, 
rather than the exact value of n, is commonly known. Section 5 discusses the results. 
2.  Theory 
The CCP Game 
  The CCP game is a non-cooperative n-person game with complete information.  The 
game is played by a group of n subjects. There are J separate alternatives (called locations) 
with mj identical prizes in each location j (j = 1, 2, . . . , J). Each prize is worth gj units.  
  Once publicly informed of the values of n, J, mj, and gj, each subject i must decide 
independently and anonymously which location to enter. Denote the number of entrants in 






= n). Once all the n subjects make their entry decisions, individual 
payoffs are determined for each subject as follows: 
  If n j < mj, then each entrant in location j receives the prize gj. 
  If n j > mj, then the mj prizes are distributed by lottery among the n j entrants such that 
exactly mj subjects receive one prize each. 
Equilibrium Solutions 
Because the players are symmetric, we focus only on the symmetric mixed strategy 
equilibrium in which each of the n players enters locations 1, 2, . . . , J with respective 
probabilities q1, q2, . . . , q J. Without loss of generality, assume that the J locations are ordered 
from 1 through J in terms of mjqj. To ensure that each location is chosen with some 
probability, small as it may be, we require that n > g1m1/gjmj "j.  Recall that the J locations   7
are independent, and that if entering location j, player i either receives the prize g j with 
certainty (if n j < mj) or with probability mj/nj (if nj > mj). Therefore, the equilibrium solution 
for risk-neutral players consists of the probability values q1 , q2, . . . , q J, that satisfy the 










































= 1, qj > 0,   j = 1, 2, . . . , J, 
 
where V denotes the expected value associated with equilibrium play. 
 
In the special case considered in the present study, where each location offers only a 
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= 1,   q j > 0,   j = 1, 2, . . . , J. 
 
These equations are solved numerically. 
  Pure strategy equilibria consist of n1
*, n2
*, . . . , nJ






* = n), such that no single player benefits from unilaterally switching from 
location j to location j
’ (j „ j
’). Given the parameter values mj and gj, the values of n j
* are 
determined computationally. Whereas the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium is unique, 
there are multiple pure strategy equilibria. In particular, the number of pure strategy 
equilibria is given by n!/(n1
*!n2
*!…nJ
*!). Note that with sufficiently many iterations of the 
same game, the mixed strategy equilibrium solution is testable on both the individual and 
aggregate levels. In contrast, the pure strategy equilibria are only testable on the aggregate 
level, as they have no implications for individual play. The number of entrants under pure 
strategy equilibrium play (n j
*) and the expected number of entrants under mixed strategy 
equilibrium play (nqj) are approximately the same, therefore obviating the need to test these 
solutions separately on the aggregate level: nj
* » nqj for j = 1, 2, . . . , J. 
Table 1 presents the six different games used in our experiment with their parameter 
values as well as their pure and mixed strategy equilibria. For all six games, n = 18. The 
approximation nj
* » nqj gets worse as the differences among the prize values increase. For 
example, the parameter values for Game 1 are g = (g1, g 2, g3) = (14, 12, 10) and m = (m1, m2, 
m3) = (1, 1, 1). Under mixed strategy equilibrium play the respective probabilities of entry are   9
0.389, 0.334, and 0.277, and the associated expected number of entrants (nqj)  are 7.002, 
6.012, and 4.986. These values come very close to the number of entrants under pure strategy 
equilibrium play, namely, 7, 6, and 5. The largest discrepancy occurs in Game 6 where the 
expected frequencies of entry in locations 1, 2, and 3 under mixed strategy equilibrium play 
are 16.308, 1.818, and 0.144, respectively, compared with the pure strategy equilibrium 
number of entrants, namely, 15, 2, and 1. It is easy to verify that for any distribution of the 
prize values, the approximation improves as n increases: nqj ﬁ nj
* as n ﬁ ¥. 
--Insert Table 1 about here-- 
3.  Experiment  
Method 
Subjects.  Seventy-two subjects participated in four separate groups of n = 18 persons each. 
The subjects were Hong Kong University of Science and Technology students, mostly 
undergraduate students of business administration, who volunteered to participate in a single 
session of a decision making experiment for payoff contingent on performance. Subjects 
earned on the average HK$146.00 plus HK$30.00 show-up fee for an average total payoff of 
HK$176.00 per subject
3 (approximately US$22.8). The payoff ranges were [76, 204], [76, 
222], [52, 304], and [88, 226] for Groups 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. 
Experimental Design.  The experimental design consisted of six different games (G = 1, 2, . . 
. , 6) each of which iterated 12 times (blocks) for a total of 6 ·12 = 72 trials. Only a single 
prize was offered by each of the three lotteries in each of the six games (m1 = m2 = m3 = 1), 
whereas the prize values differed across the six games (Table 1). The six games were 
constructed to differ from one another in the variability of the prizes. We measured this 
variability by the range of the three prizes, denoted by D (Table 1). The ranges for games 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, and 6 were 4, 10, 10, 18, 20, and 28, respectively. The sum of the prizes was fixed at 
$36 for each game G.    10 
Procedure.  The experiment was computer-controlled. Upon arrival at the computer 
laboratory (which contains 80 PCs), the subjects of each group were seated at one of 18 
computer terminals that were spread over the entire laboratory. Communication between the 
subjects was prohibited. The instructions were presented on the individual computer screens 
in front of the subjects using PowerPoint Slide Show 4. The subjects read the instructions at 
their own pace with no time pressure. The first twelve computer screens of the instructions 
are reproduced in the Appendix
5. 
  The subjects were instructed that they would participate in a game played repeatedly. 
Their task was to choose one of three lotteries, called (and marked on the screen) Yellow, 
Blue, and Red. At the beginning of the round, the prize values (gj) and number of prizes in 
each lottery (mj) were displayed to the subjects, who were then required to choose one of the 
three lotteries. Screen 4 of the Appendix shows an example with three lotteries, where g = 
(10, 15, 20) and m = (1, 1, 1). (The colors of the three lotteries in the Appendix are 
suppressed.) The subjects were instructed that the game parameters would vary from round to 
round. Once all of them made their decision, the values of nj were displayed on the individual 
screens (see screen 6 of the Appendix), and the prizes were distributed (see screens 7 – 10 of 
the Appendix). 
  After reading the information displayed on the first 12 screens, the subject’s 
understanding of the procedure was tested through four hypothetical questions (not displayed  
in the Appendix) that varied the parameter values and number of entrants. The experiment 
commenced only after each of the 18 subjects answered these questions correctly. The 
subjects were told that they would be paid their cumulative earnings at the end o f the 
experiment plus HK$30.00 show-up fee. 
  On each of the 12 blocks of trials, Games 1 through 6 (Table 1) were presented in a 
different random order. To prevent response biases (e.g., color preference), the prize values   11 
for the same game were varied across colors in a balanced design, so that each of the six 
permutations of the three prize values appeared exactly twice. The entire experiment lasted 
about 75 minutes. 
Results 
We begin this section with a brief summary of the major findings. We first provide 
evidence for significant game effects but no differences between the four groups and no 
evidence for changes in the aggregate choice of entry locations across iterations of each of 
the six games. Next, we show that the mixed strategy equilibrium solution for risk-neutral 
players organizes the aggregate results quite well. However, we observe a systematic 
departure from equilibrium play, namely, an inverted S-shaped function that is first concave 
and then convex, slightly over-weighting low equilibrium probabilities of entry and under-
weighting high equilibrium probabilities. This systematic deviation disappears when the 
assumption of common risk-neutrality is replaced by the assumption of common risk-
aversion. However, the mixed strategy equilibrium solution does not account for the behavior 
of most individual subjects. Rather, most subjects tend to change their location entry choices 
less frequently than predicted, and adjust their decisions from one iteration of a game to 
another along the lines suggested by anticipatory learning models. Evidence in support of 
these claims is presented below. 
Aggregate Decisions. 
The expected payoff per subject under pure strategy equilibrium play is $2.00 per trial 
for a total of $144.00 for the entire experimental session. The expected value and standard 
deviation of the individual payoff for the session under mixed strategy equilibrium play are 
140.46 and 47.04, respectively. The mean individual payoff of Groups 1, 2, 3, and 4 was 
146.00, 147.78, 146.00, and 145.89, respectively. Although in each group the subjects earned 
on the average about 4 percent more that expected, none of the differences is statistically   12 
significant (t18 < 1). Nor is there any evidence for differences between groups with respect to 
the mean individual payoff. 
To further test for differences between groups and trends across time, we divided the 
72 rounds of play into six blocks of 12 rounds each. For each round t (t = 1, 2, . . . , 72), we 
computed a root mean square deviation score, RMSDt, between  the observed and predicted 
number of entries: 







jt nq jt n
1
2 ) ( ,  
where n jt is the observed number of entries in location j on round t, nqjt is the expected 
number of entries in location j on round t under mixed strategy equilibrium play, and J = 3. 
These RMSDt scores (72 for each group) were then subjected to a 4 · 6 group by block 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the block factor. Neither of the two main effects due to 
group and block, nor the group by block two-way interaction effect were significant (F3, 264 < 
1, F5, 264 < 1, and F15, 264 < 1, respectively).  
To examine the changes across rounds of play more closely, we computed the running 
mean of the RMSDt scores in steps of 12 (rounds 1 - 12, 2 - 13, . . . , 61 - 72). Figure 1 
displays the running means for each group separately and across the four groups (bottom 
panel). There is no indication for changes in the deviation scores across rounds of play for 
each of the four groups, nor is there any evidence for differences among the four groups. The 
running means for individual groups vary between 1.1 and 1.8 and do not exhibit any 
discernible trend. When the data are combined across the four groups, the running means 
exhibit more stability (bottom panel) due to averaging with only minor oscillations between 
1.3 and 1.5. Taken together, these analyses support our claims of no group or learning effects. 
--Insert Fig. 1 about here--   13 
  To test for game effects, the 72 · 4 = 288 RMSDt scores were subjected to a 4 · 6 
group by game ANOVA with repeated measures on the game factor. As expected from the 
previous analysis, the main effect due to group was not significant (F3, 264 < 1). The group by 
game interaction effect was also not significant (F15, 264 < 1). However, the main effect due to 
game was highly significant (F5, 264 = 4.73, p < 0.001). A post-hoc comparison showed that 
the game main effect was due to the difference between Games 1 and 3 on the one hand and 
Games 5 and 6 on the other hand. The mean RMSD scores for Games 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 were 
1.06, 1.25, 1.13, 1.24, 1.43, and 1.52, respectively. With one exception, these scores increase 
in the range (D) of the payoffs. The subjects' behavior is better accounted for by the mixed 
strategy equilibrium solution as the three prizes are closer to one another (and, consequently, 
the equilibrium probabilities are closer to 0.333). 
With no evidence for group differences or changes in aggregate choice of entry 
locations over time, the results were combined across groups and rounds of play. Table 2 
(first row in each of the six panels) shows the means and standard deviations of the observed 
frequency of location entries. The results are presented separately for each game (across the 
12 replications). Table 2 also presents (second row of each panel) the expected values and 
standard deviations of frequency of entry under mixed strategy equilibrium play for risk -
neutral players. (The number of entries for each game under pure strategy equilibrium play 
can be read directly from Table 1.)  
--Insert Table 2 about here-- 
  Our major dependent variable is the mean frequency of entry location. Because the 
group, rather than the individual subject, is the unit of analysis, we present the results 
separately for each group. Figure 2 portrays the observed relative frequencies of entry against 
the mixed strategy equilibrium probabilities of entry. The results are displayed separately by 
group, and then combined across groups in the bottom panel. Figure 2 shows that in each case   14 
the observed relative frequencies of entry decisions increase monotonically in the theoretical 
probabilities.  This finding provides strong evidence for tacit coordination. However, there is 
a systematic deviation from equilibrium play with subjects entering too frequently when the 
theoretical probabilities are relatively small and too infrequently when they are relatively 
high. The empirical function in each of the four panels in Fig. 2 crosses the 45 degree 
diagonal line at a point between 0.3 and 0.4. The results displayed in Fig. 2 are consistent 
with the shape of the probability weighting function postulated by Prospect Theory for 
individual decision making under risk (Prelec, 1998; Tversky & Wakker, 1995) and with the 
supportive empirical evidence presented by Lattimore et al. (1992) and Wu and Gonzalez 
(1996, 1998). 
--Insert Fig. 2 about here-- 
Value and Probability Weighting Transformations 
  The systematic deviation between the observed and predicted frequencies of location 
entry may be due to the failure of the expected utility hypothesis, which is invoked by the 
equilibrium solution. We pursue below two alternative explanations for this systematic 
deviation, which are based on the value and probability weighting transformations proposed 
by Prospect theory. It may be recalled that Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992), as well as other related non-linear expected utility models, proposes to 
account for the failure of the expected utility hypothesis by representing individual 
preferences by a sign and rank dependent functional V(P), with a value function n(x) for 
monetary outcomes, and two probability weighting functions, w+(p) for gains (x > 0) and w-
(p) for losses (x < 0). Because our experiment is only concerned with gains, the choice of 
these functions is simplified 
  Following Tversky and Kahneman (1991), Lattimore et al. (1992), and the estimation 
results they present, we assume that n is a concave power function of the form   15 
  n(x) = xc  0 < c < 1. 
This function has been used extensively in both utility function estimation (e.g., Galanter, 
1962; Fishburn & Kochenberger, 1979) and Prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). 
(for a recent evaluation of the experimental evidence that supports concavity in the domain of 
gains, see Luce, 2000, Ch. 3.) Review of the literature on the shape and properties of the 
probability weighting function (e.g., Camerer & Ho, 1994; Gonzalez & Wu, 1999; Tversky & 
Fox, 1995; Prelec, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992: Wu & Gonzalez, 1996, 1998) reveals 
several alternative functions. We have chosen to employ the single-parameter probability 
weighting function 
  w
+(p) = exp[- (- ln p)
a],  0 < a < 1, 
proposed by Prelec (1998). Prelec's function is the identity line when a = 1; it becomes more 
regressive as a decreases. It has a fixed point at 1/e = 0.368, which agrees with the cross-over 
points in Fig. 2. Like the value function n, it includes only a single parameter, thereby 
allowing for a straightforward comparison between these two independent transformations. 
  The value transformation applies directly to the prize values gj. The probability 
weighting transformation applies directly to the (endogenously determined) probability of the 
outcome of the lottery chosen by the subject. Our purpose here is to determine whether the 
former or latter transformation (or both) can better account for the systematic deviation from 
equilibrium play that we reported in Fig. 2. To do so, we compute the equilibrium solution 
under either of these two transformations while assuming that the other transformation is kept 
fixed as the identity function.   16 
Value Transformation.  Assuming the same value transformation for all the n players, the 
equilibrium solution in mixed strategies consists of the probability values q j(c), that satisfy 
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) (  = 1, q j(c) > 0. 
Equation (3) is like Eq. (2) with g j replaced by g j
c and q j by q j(c). The power function can be 
interpreted as a Prospect Theory type of value transformation or, alternatively, as a concave 
utility function. We wish to determine the value of c that minimizes the difference between 
the observed and predicted relative frequencies of entry summed across subjects and games. 
The criterion to be minimized is the root mean square deviation given by 
  RMSD(c) = 
18
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where hG,j is the observed mean relative frequency of entry in location j in Game G (G = 1, 2, 
. .  , 6) , and qG,j(c) is the corresponding equilibrium probability of entry. 
The best fitting value of the parameter c that minimizes the criterion RMSD(c) across 
all four groups is c = 0.496. The corresponding equilibrium expected frequencies of entry, 
nqj(c = 0.496), are presented in the third line of each panel in Table 2. The minimum criterion 
value associated with c = 0.496 is RMSD(c = 0.496) = 0.113. This value is about one fourth 
of the value associated with the mixed strategy equilibrium solution under risk-neutrality, 
namely, RMSD(c = 1) = 0.463.  The observed relative frequencies of entry are plotted against 
the equilibrium probabilities q j(c) in Fig. 3 for each group separately and across all the four 
groups. The figure indicates that under the assumption of a common power value function 
(or, alternatively, a power utility function) with parameter value c = 0.496, the mixed strategy   17 
equilibrium solution accounts for the aggregate results of each group remarkably well. To 
measure the goodness of fit, we reg ressed the observed relative frequencies summarized 
across all four groups on the theoretical probabilities. The percentage of variance accounted 
for by the solution was very high (R
2 = 0.906). Most importantly for our purpose, and in 
support of the equilibrium solution, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the slope of the 
regression line (0.994) is equal to unity (t17 < 1) and the intercept is equal to zero. 
--Insert Fig. 3 about here-- 
Probability Weighting Transformation.  Assuming the same probability weighting 
transformation for all the n players, the equilibrium solution in mixed strategies for risk-
neutral players consists of the probability values qj(a), that satisfy the J + 1 equations 





























)(q j(a))k[1 – qj(a)]n – 1 – k,    j = 1, 2, . . . , J. 
As we did earlier with the value transformation, we wish to determine the value of a that 
minimize s the difference between the observed relative frequencies and the equilibrium 
probabilities of entry. We use the same root mean square deviation criterion, after replacing q j 
by qj(a) and c by a. 
  Our results show that the probability weighting function (4) does not improve the 
results in any significant way, and cannot account for the deviation between the observed 
relative frequencies and equilibrium probabilities of entry reported above (Fig. 2). The best 
fitting value of a is 0.873 and the RMDS(a = 0.873) score is 0.395, not much better than the   18 
reported RMSD for a = 1 (0.463). We conclude that the aggregate results can be accounted 
for by the mixed strategy equilibrium solution under the assumption that all the n players 
share the same attitude to risk expressed by a concave power utility function with the same 
parameter value. 
Joint Probabilities of Entry Location Choice.  
We turn next to test a major implication of mixed strategy play. In doing so, we 
assume that the mixed strategy equilibrium solution for risk-averse (c = 0.496) players holds, 
and employ the equilibrium expected number of entries (and the corresponding probabilities) 
that are displayed in the third row of each panel of Table 2. Under the null hypothesis of 
mixed strategy equilibrium play, the 72 rounds of play of each subject should be considered 
as independent. Consequently, it is possible to compute the joint probabilities of choice of 
entry location j on iteration t of game G and choice of entry location j' (j, j' = 1, 2, 3) on 
iteration t + 1 of the same game.
6 These joint probabilities are time invariant, and should 
apply to all 11 pairs of successive iterations (excluding the first time each game was 
presented). Table 3 (right-hand panel) presents the expected 3 · 3 joint probabilities, one for 
each game. When multiplied by n, the marginal probabilities are the expected frequencies of 
entry presented in Table 2 (third row for risk-averse players). Each probability (shaded) to the 
right of the marginal probabilities is the sum of the three entries in the minor diagonal of the 
transition matrix. Therefore, this number is simply the probability of staying on the same 
location that was chosen in the previous iteration of the same game G. Table 3 shows that 
under mixed strategy equilibrium play the probabilities of staying on vary across the six 
games from 0.337 in Game 1 to 0.469 in Game 6, and that they slowly increase in the range 
of the prizes D. 
--Insert Table 3 about here--   19 
  We computed the corresponding observed joint relative frequencies of choice of entry 
location in successive iterations of the same game across all the subjects in the four groups 
(six games by 11 iterations, excluding the first presentation of each game on rounds 1 through 
6). This computation was conducted for each game separately. The observed joint relative 
frequencies are presented in the left-hand panel of Table 3. The observed relative frequencies 
of staying on the same location as in the previous iteration of the game are shown to the right 
of the marginal relative frequencies of entry. 
  Although the observed marginal relative frequencies of entry are accounted for quite 
well by the expected marginal equilibrium probabilities (Fig. 3), the observed joint relative 
frequencies of staying on the same location exceed the corresponding theoretical values in 
each of the six games. Thus, although the subjects did not always choose the same location 
on successive iterations of the same game G, they tended to choose the same location more 
often than predicted (i.e., “inertia” effect). These results reject the mixed strategy equilibrium 
solution (allowing for common risk -aversion) as an explanatory concept.  
  This tendency of staying on the same location might be due to some or all of the 
subjects. Turning from the aggregate to individual data, we computed for each subject the 
number of times, out of 11, that he or she chose the same location on successive iterations of 
the same game G. We then added up these six frequencies to obtain for each subject the total 
frequency of staying on, a number between 0 and 66. The actual individual frequencies of 
staying on ranged between 26 and 66 with a mean of 39. Under mixed strategy equilibrium 
play (for risk -averse subjects), the expected value and standard deviation of the number of 
staying on decisions are 27.18 and 4.11, respectively. The null hypothesis that the observed 
number of staying on decisions is not different from the predicted value could not be rejected 
for 32 of the 72 subjects (44.4%). The remaining subjects stayed on the same location 
significantly more often than predicted (p < 0.01). With one exception, all the subjects   20 
occasionally changed the location of entry presumably in an attempt to increase their 
expected payoffs. However, more than half of them did not change their choice of location as 
often as predicted by the mixed strategy equilibrium solution. 
Effects of Under- and Over-entry .   
We may turn the issue and ask why, in the first place, did the subjects change the 
location of their entry from one iteration of game G to another? One possible reason is that 
subjects are mixing their strategies and choosing a location in an independent and random 
fashion across iterations (even if the actual choice probabilities are different from the 
expected probabilities based on risk-neutrality or risk-aversion assumptions). Yet another 
hypothesis, that allows for dependencies between iterations, is that subjects attempted to 
increase their expected payoffs by exploiting the deviations between the observed and what 
they considered to be the “appropriate” level of entry in each location of every game. 
  To test the latter hypothesis, we proceeded with the following analysis that focuses on 
the player's decision to either stay on the same location or switch to another location, 
conditional on the outcome of her previous decision. Note that for each game G, the ratio rj = 
gj/(g1 + g2 + g3), j = 1, 2, 3, may be interpreted as the relative attraction of prize (location) j. 
Therefore, nrj may be interpreted by the subject as the expected number of entrants in 
location j. Because of our choice of the game parameters (Table 1), nrj is also the pure 
strategy number of entrants in location j. We assume that subjects used nrj as a benchmark for 
determining whether too many or too few subjects had decided to enter each of the three 
locations. In particular, for each subject i, if she entered location j on iteration t, we classified 
the outcome for this location as "over-entry
7" if nj(t) > nrj or "under-entry" if n j(t) < nrj, where 
nj(t) is the number of entrants in location j on iteration t. We also classified subject i's 
decision on the next iteration of the same game G as "staying on" if she entered the same 
location j, "better switching" if she entered some other location j', where j' (j' „ j) is the more   21 
attractive of the two other locations, and "worse switching" if she entered some other location 
j'', where j'' is the less attractive of the two other locations. The attractiveness of each of the 
other two locations is computed as the magnitude of their over- or under-entry on trial t. For 
example, supposing that subject i entered location 1 of Game 3 (for which g = (18, 10, 8)) 
and that the number of entrants in locations 1, 2, and 3 was 12, 3, and 3, respectively. The 
expected number of entries for this game is 9, 5, and 4, respectively.  Consequently, in this 
case, location 1 is over-entered (12 > 9) and locations 2 and 3 are under-entered (3 < 5 and 3 
< 4).  Of the latter two, location 2 is more attractive since the magnitude of under-entry (5 – 3 
= 2) is higher in location 2 than in location 3 (4 – 3 = 1). In the same example, if the number 
of entrants into locations 1, 2, and 3 is 8, 7, and 5, respectively, this is a case of under-entry in 
location 1 (8 < 9). Of locations 2 and 3, location 3 is the more attractive because it is less 
over-entered (1 vs. 2)
8. 
For each game separately and across all subjects, we computed six conditional 
probabilities. The first, p(stay‰over), is the conditional probability of staying on the same 
location j as in the previous iteration of the same game G, given that location j was over-
subscribed ("over-entry"). The second, p(stay ‰under), is defined similarly, given that location 
j was under-subscribed ("under-entry"). The third conditional probability, p(better 
switch‰over), is the probability of switching from location j to the more attractive location j', 
given that location j was over-subscribed, and the fourth, p(better switch‰under), is defined 
similarly, given that location j was under-subscribed. The two remaining conditional 
probabilities, namely, p(worse switch‰over) and p(worse switch‰under) were computed in a 
similar way. Table 4 presents the six conditional probabilities (computed across all the 
subjects) separately for each game. 
--Insert Table 4 about here--   22 
  A direct implication of virtually any adaptive learning model is that a subject would 
be more likely to stay on location j on iteration t + 1 than switch to another location, if 
location j was under-subscribed on iteration t. This implication is derived by most theories of 
reinforcement learning (e.g., Roth & Erev, 1995), belief learning (e.g., Fudenberg & Levine, 
1998), direction learning (Selten & Buchta, 1999), and hybrid models like EWA (Camerer & 
Ho, 1999) that combine reinforcement and belief learning. Subjects will be more likely to 
switch if location j was over-subscribed on iteration t
9. Further, we also expect that given a 
decision to switch, the more attractive option (vis-à-vis the outcome of the previous iteration) 
will be chosen. The patterns of the results in Table 4 clearly contradict the above reasoning. 
First, in Games 1 to 4 subjects are more likely to stay at the same location after over-entry 
compared to under-entry. The reverse (and expected) trend is only found in Games 5 and 6.  
Second, given a decision to switch after over-entry, in three games (Games 1 - 3) it was 
toward the less attractive location, and in the other 3 games (Games 4 - 6) toward the more 
attractive location. The same decisions after under-entry are ev en more puzzling when in all 
games (except Game 4) the switching was made toward the less attractive alternative. 
  We interpret these results as evidence for a kind of strategic thinking on the part of 
some of the subjects in which the next move of the remaining players is anticipated. It is as if 
the subject is reasoning as follows: "Because the outcome resulted in under-subscription, the 
tendency of the other players to enter the same location on the next time the same game is 
played will probably increase. As this will result in over-entry, it is therefore better for me to 
switch." And in the case of over-entry, it is as if the subject is reasoning as follows: "Because 
the outcome resulted in over-entry, most entrants will tend to switch to the better alternative, 
which consequently may become over-subscribed. Therefore, it is better for me either to stay 
on the same location or switch to the worse of the two locations." This interpretation is 
consistent with formal models that incorporate some kind of “anticipatory learning” (e.g., Ho,   23 
Camerer, & Weigelt, 1998). It cannot be tested without first collecting additional data (e.g., 
by using verbal protocols or administrating post-experimental questionnaires) which bear 
directly on the subjects' cognitive processes. 
4. Generalization to Uncertain Group Size 
A major limitation of the CCP game as a model of choice between lotteries is the 
assumption that the values of the prizes and the number of group members are commonly 
known. In reality (e.g., choice of which state lottery to enter) the values of the prizes are 
typically private knowledge and it is only reasonable to assume that the distribution of the 
number of agents, rather than the exact number of agents, is commonly known. To relax the 
latter limitation, we generalize below the CCP game to the case where only the distribution of 
the number of agents is commonly known. We show that if the expected value of this 
distribution is relatively large, the effect of uncertainty is negligible. 
Assume that the group size has a commonly known distribution in which the random 
variable nh takes on the values n1, n 2, . . . , nH with respective probabilities p 1, p2, . . . , pH. 
Then, the equilibrium solution in mixed strategies for risk-neutral players consists of the 
probabilities q1, q2, . . . , q J, which satisfy the following J + 1 equations in J + 1 unknowns 









































k(1 – qj) h n  – 1 – k] = V,   
and 
  q1 + q2 + . . . + qJ = 1,     q j > 0, j = 1, 2, . . . , J. 
  In the special case examined in the present study, where each location includes a 
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  q1 + q2 + . . . + qJ = 1,  qj > 0, j = 1, 2, . . . , J. 












[1 - (1 - qj) h n ]) = V,              (5) 
and 
  q1 + q2 + . . . + qJ = 1,  qj > 0, j = 1, 2, . . . , J. 
  We assumed a (discrete) uniform distribution of number of players with p1 = p 2 = . . . 
= pH and expected value mn = 18. We then increased systematically the range of the 
distribution (e.g., n + 1 = [17, 18, 19], n + 2 = [16, 17, 18, 19, 20], up to n + 5), and solved 
the system of equations (5) for each of these five cases separately to investigate the effect of 
the range of the distribution of nh on the mixed strategy equilibrium solution. For each of our 
six games (Table 1), the changes in the equilibrium probability qj for the cases n + 1 through 
n + 5 were in the third decimal point. In Game 6, which provides the most extreme case, the 
equilibrium solution for n + 5 was (q1, q 2, q 3) = (0.896, 0.099, 0.005). In contrast (Table 1), 
the equilibrium solution for the case when n = 18 with certainty is (q 1, q2, q3) = (0.891, 0.101, 
0.008). In all other cases, the discrepancy between the uncertain and certain cases was much 
smaller. These results show that the effect of uncertainty about group size decreases as 1) the 
expected value mn increases, and 2) the magnitude of uncertainty decreases. They suggest that 
when mn  is relatively large, as in our experiment, the effects of uncertainty about group size 
are negligible. 
5. Discussion 
  Our study was designed to investigate the lottery mechanism fo r distributing limited 
supply of some indivisible good when demand exceeds supply. We conducted this   25 
investigation experimentally in a conflict situation that allows for both strategic and outcome 
uncertainties. The CCP game was introduced to model interactive decision situations in 
which agents have to choose one of several independent lotteries. The standard solution 
concept for this class of interactive decision making situations is the Nash equilibrium, 
namely, a profile of n independent decisions, pure or mixed, from which no player wishes to 
deviate unilaterally. On the aggregate level, our results support the solution concept 
remarkably well under the plausible assumption of common risk-aversion in the domain of 
gains. However, we find no evidence for mixed strategy play on the individual level. Nor do 
we find evidence for learning trends across blocks of trials. We comment on these findings 
below.  
Aggregate Results.  Our analysis shows no evidence that the systematic discrepancy between 
the observed relative frequencies of choice of entry location and the predicted probabilities 
under the assumption of risk-neutrality can be accounted for by a probability weighting 
transformation of the kind proposed by Prospect Theory. We have been quite successful in 
explaining this discrepancy by assuming common risk-aversion. Our results (Fig. 3) show 
that for each of the four groups this discrepancy largely disappears once we assume a 
commonly shared risk attitude captured by a concave power function with a parameter value 
c = 0.496. Because our study is only concerned with the domain of gains, as all the prizes in 
our six games were positive, the alternative interpretations of this power function as a 
Prospect Theory value function or a classical utility function coincide. The two 
interpretations could be compared to each other if we introduced more complicated lotteries 
that allow for both positive and negative prizes. 
  We are uneasy about specifying a Prospect Theory type value (or utility function) 
parameter that has the effect of pushing the equilibrium predictions in the direction of the 
observed data. As Friedman noted, “arbitrary special utility effects could ‘explain’ virtually   26 
any sort of data” (1982, p. 1376). We find it reassuring that the value function  that we used 
has received considerable support in the extensive literature on Prospect Theory that focuses 
on individual choice behavior. Our risk-aversion parameter estimate is slightly lower than the 
estimates reported by Cox and Oaxaca (1996) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) in 
completely different contexts. It is very close to the risk aversion coefficient reported by 
Harrison (1990) in the 4-person experiment of Cox, Robertson, and Smith (1982) that he 
considered. And it is almost identical to the estimated risk aversion coefficient (c = 0.52) 
reported in a recent experiment on private-value auctions conducted by Goeree, Holt, and 
Palfrey (1999). Goeree et al. observed overbidding relative to the risk-neutral Nash 
equilibrium prediction in their experiments. Assuming that their subjects exhibit constant risk 
aversion, with estimated (pooled) parameter value of c = 0.52, they succeeded in tracking the 
conditional bid averages quite successfully as well as reproducing the entire frequency 
distributions of bidding decisions. 
Individual Results.  We go beyond Goeree et al. in testing the equilibrium model on the 
individual level. Our results show that although the equilibrium solution organizes the 
aggregate results quite well, it does not account for the individual behavior. With 
communication not allowed and group size being quite large, it was not possible for our 
subjects to achieve coordination through pure strategy equilibrium play. The patterns of joint 
relative frequencies of choice presented in Table 3  and conditional probabilities of staying on 
the same location or switching to another location shown in Table 4 are largely inconsistent 
with mixed strategy play. Rather, our results show marked individual differences. They 
suggest that the orderly aggreg ate behavior is in fact a product of a variety of individual 
decision rules. Some of our subjects mix their choices, not unlike the predictions of the 
equilibrium solution, whereas others strive to achieve coordination by attempting to increase   27 
their expected payoff across trials through some sort of strategic play based on anticipation of 
the other players’ future moves. 
  This strategic play often takes the form of “best reply to anticipated best reply by the 
other players.” It resembles similar conceptualizations of a hierarchy of levels of strategic 
thinking in a model proposed by Stahl and Wilson (1995). Our experimental design is not 
suited for testing the hypothesis of a negative correlation between player i’s tendency to use a 
particular decision rule and the tendency of the other group members to use the same rule. An 
experimental design in which games are presented in a blocked design, similar to the one 
used in the study of tacit coordination in market entry games by Erev and Rapoport (1998), 
rather than a randomized design, as used in the present study, is more suitable. 
Learning.  We observe no major trends across blocks in the level of coordination achieved by 
our subjects (Fig. 1). This result is puzzling because previous experimental studies of tacit 
coordination in large group market entry games (e.g., Erev & Rapoport, 1998; Rapoport, 
Seale, & Parco, in press; Rapoport, Seale, & Winter, 2000) reported steady improvement in 
coordination on the aggregate level for the first fifty trials or so. We hypothesize that the 
difference between “flat” and “non-flat” learning curves is mainly due to two major 
differences between these two classes of studies. First, whereas the previous market entry 
game experiments included only strategic uncertainty, the present study included both 
strategic and outcome uncertainty. Second, the market entry game experiments provided the 
subject with an option to stay out of the market, whereas the present study did not provide 
this option. These differences might have led the subjects to achieve tacit coordination—
remarkable in both cases—through different adjustment processes, namely, slow emergence 
of cutoff decision rules in the market entry games vs. some combination of randomization 
with best reply to anticipated group behavior in the present study. Additional studies of   28 
coordination that use other tasks that manipulate both sources of uncertainty and the presence 
or absence of an outside option are needed to test this hypothesis.   29 
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Table 1 
Parameter Values and Equilibrium Solutions for the Six Games 
 
  Prize Values    No. of Prizes    Pure Strategy 
Equilibrium 
  Mixed Strategy 
Equilibrium 
Game G  g1  g2  g3  D  m1  m2  m3    n1
*  n2
*  n3
*    q1  q2  q3 
1  14  12  10  4  1  1  1    7  6  5    .389  .334  .277 
2  16  14  6  10  1  1  1    8  7  3    .447  .392  .161 
3  18  10  8  10  1  1  1    9  5  4    .502  .278  .220 
4  20  14  2  18  1  1  1    10  7  1    .585  .409  .006 
5  24  8  4  20  1  1  1    12  4  2    .681  .225  .094 
6  30  4  2  28  1  1  1    15  2  1    .891  .101  .008 
   34 
  
Table 2 
Means (and STD) of Observed and Expected Mixed Strategy Equilibrium Number of Entrie s 
 
      j = 1    j = 2    j = 3 
Game      Mean  SD    Mean  SD    Mean  SD 
                     
1  Observed    7.312  2.031    5.417  1.916    5.271  2.189 
  Expected  Risk-neutral  7.002  2.068    6.012  2.001    4.986  1.899 
  Expected  Risk-averse*  6.831  2.059    5.499  1.954    5.670  1.971 
                     
2  Observed    8.000  1.888    5.333  1.840    4.667  2.134 
  Expected  Risk-neutral  8.046  2.109    7.056  2.071    2.898  1.559 
  Expected  Risk-averse  6.995  2.068    6.152  2.012    4.853  1.883 
                     
3  Observed    7.542  1.798    5.917  1.991    4.542  1.723 
  Expected  Risk-neutral  9.036  2.121    5.004  1.901    3.960  1.757 
  Expected  Risk-averse  7.671  2.098    5.347  1.939    4.982  1.898 
                     
4  Observed    9.125  2.060    5.875  2.077    3.000  1.545 
  Expected  Risk-neutral  10.530  2.090    7.362  2.086    0.108  0.328 
  Expected  Risk-averse  8.376  2.116    6.640  2.047    2.984  1.578 
                     
5  Observed    9.000  1.534    5.250  1.610    3.750  1.536 
  Expected  Risk-neutral  12.258  1.977    4.050  1.772    1.692  1.238 
  Expected  Risk-averse  9.393  2.119    5.238  1.927    3.369  1.655 
                     
6  Observed    11.563  1.717    3.583  1.738    2.854  1.416 
  Expected  Risk-neutral  16.038  1.322    1.818  1.278    0.144  0.378 
  Expected  Risk-averse  11.393  2.045    3.775  1.727    2.832  1.545 
 
*  Assuming that n(x) = x
0.496   35 
Table 3 




    Observed    Predicted* (Mixed Eq.) 
Game    j = 1  j = 2   j = 3      j = 1  j = 2   j = 3   
1  j = 1   .199  .109  .105      0.144  0.116  0.120   
  j = 2   .095  .121  .085      0.116  0.093  0.096   
  j = 3   .116  .072  .098      0.120  0.096  0.099   
  Sum  .410  .302  .288  .418    0.380  0.306  0.315  .337 
                      2  j = 1   .253  .102  .092      0.151  0.133  0.105   
  j = 2   .115  .117  .067      0.133  0.117  0.092   
  j = 3   .081  .067  .106      0.105  0.092  0.073   
  Sum  .449  .286  .265  .476    0.389  0.342  0.270  .341 
                      3  j = 1   .230  .110  .078      0.182  0.127  0.118   
  j = 2   .116  .130  .083      0.127  0.088  0.082   
  j = 3   .066  .091  .096      0.118  0.082  0.077   
  Sum  .412  .331  .257  .456    0.426  0.297  0.277  .346 
                      4  j = 1   .319  .128  .057      0.217  0.172  0.077   
  j = 2   .133  .158  .039      0.172  0.136  0.061   
  j = 3   .053  .038  .076      0.077  0.061  0.027   
  Sum  .505  .324  .172  .553    0.465  0.369  0.166  .380 
                      5  j = 1   .326  .122  .062      0.272  0.152  0.098   
  j = 2   .109  .102  .071      0.152  0.085  0.054   
  j = 3   .061  .071  .077      0.098  0.054  0.035   
  Sum  .496  .295  .210  .505    0.522  0.291  0.187  .392 
                      6  j = 1   .489  .083  .073      0.401  0.133  0.100   
  j = 2   .093  .062  .040      0.133  0.044  0.033   
  j = 3   .057  .053  .049      0.100  0.033  0.025   
  Sum  .640  .198  .162  .600    0.633  0.210  0.157  .469 
 
* These are the mixed strategy equilibrium probabilities under the assumption of a common 
power value (utility) function with a parameter c = 0.496.   36 
Table 4 
Mean Conditional Probabilities of Staying on and Switching between Successive Iterations of 
the Same Game 
 
 
  Game 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
p(stay | over)  0.489  0.557  0.530  0.624  0.354  0.222 
p(better switch‰over)  0.170  0.198  0.205  0.233  0.396  0.542 
p(worse switch‰over)  0.341  0.245  0.265  0.143  0.250  0.236 
p(stay‰under)  0.337  0.355  0.366  0.446  0.456  0.604 
p(better switch‰under)  0.294  0.279  0.238  0.328  0.229  0.170 
p(worse switch‰under)  0.369  0.366  0.396  0.226  0.315  0.226 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
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APPENDIX 
Instruction (first twelve screens) 
 
Greetings!
You are about to participate in a decision making study.  At 
the end of the session you will be paid according to your 
performance.  A research foundation has contributed the 
funds to support this research.
Please read the instructions very carefully.
Next Page  
You are going to participate 
in many rounds of basically 
the same game.  The game is 
very simple.If you make 
good decisions, you increase 
your chances of earning a 
considerable amount of 
money.
Next Page Back Page  
The game is played by a group of 18 players 
(all those who are currently present at the PC 
Lab). You will repeatedly play the game (in 
rounds) with the same group of 18 players.
On each round, three lotteries will be 
conducted (called the YELLOW, BLUE and 
RED lotteries).  You can participate in one and 
only one of these lotteries.  You will be asked 
to choose participating in one of these lotteries 
without knowing the lotteries the other players 
in your group have selected.
At the beginning of each round, the 
information about the three lotteries will be 
presented in the following way:
The Game
 
Number of players in the group: 18 (you are one of them)
Example
In this round:
§ The YELLOW lottery offers 1 prize of $10.
§ The RED lottery offers 1 prize of $15.
§ The BLUE lottery offers 1 prize of $20.















Number of players in the group: 18 (you are one of them)
Example
Because the prizes offered in each of the three lotteries may va ry 
from round to round, you should pay close attention to them.
After all the members in your group choose which lottery to play, 
the computer will display the number of players who chose each of 
the three lotteries in the following manner:
 
Number of players in the group: 18 (you are one of them)
Example
For example, in this round,  6 players chose to play the 
YELLOW lottery, 8 to play the RED lottery, and 4 to play the 









If only one player chooses to play in a 
given lottery then this player will win 
the prize.
If, however, more than one player 
choose to participate in a given lottery 
then the computer will randomly select 
the winner from those choosing to 






Number of players in the group: 18 (you are one of them)
Example
For example, if 5 players chose the YELLOW lottery, 1 chose the 
RED lottery, and 12 chose the BLUE lottery, then the one player 
who had chosen the RED lottery wins $15.
One of the 5 players who chose the  YELLOW lottery will be 
randomly selected to win $10, and one of the 12 players who chose 
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Number of players in the group: 18 (you are one of them)
Example
Each of the 5 players who choose the YELLOW lottery is equally 
likely to be selected as the winner of the $10.  Similarly, eachof  the 
12 players who choose the BLUE lottery is equally likely to be 
selected as the winner of the $20.
Naturally, if no one choose any particular  lottery, the prize of this 









Number of players in the group: 18 (you are one of them)
Example
On each round, if you are not selected to win the prize in the lottery 









If you are the only one who choose 
to participate in any particular 
lottery then you will win this lottery 
prize for sure.
On the other hand, the more players 
choose the same lottery as you do 




We shall now test your 
understanding of the game.  
If your answers are incorrect, 
the computer will show you 
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Endnotes 
                                                   
1 See, for example, the uproar over the news (in October 1999) that Coca-Cola Co. is studying wireless 
technology that could allow bottlers to raise or lower soda prices by remote control at certain times — say, 
during hot weather. Lower prices during periods of slower sales would presumably bring in more business. 
 
2 Or a probability that is based on an objective criterion such as the number of shares paid for in an IPO. 
 
3 The amount of the cash prize was very attractive to students considering that the hourly wage for an on-
campus job was about HK$50 (US$6.45). 
 
4 In a “browse at a kiosk (full screen)” mode. 
 
5 The full instructions in PowerPoint format are available in 
http://home.ust.hk/~mkzwick/papers/CCPinstructions.ppt 
 
6 Any two iterations of the same game G are separated on the average by six rounds of play. This number 
changes across blocks because of the independent randomization of the six games in each block. 
 
7 The “over-entry” category includes the cases where n j(t) = nrj. The results are not affected if we exclude these 
cases from this category. 
 
8 If two locations have the same magnitude of over- or under-entry, the one with the higher prize is considered 
to be the more attractive one. 
 
9 The assumption is that even if the subject actually won the prize (when the location he selected was over 
subscribed) he should attribute a large portion of his success to luck rather than to wise decision making. 
 